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Abstract.  
A new approach is suggested under the slogan “Keep it Descriptive Stupid” (KIDS) 
that encapsulates a trend in increasingly descriptive agent-based social simulation.  
The KIDS approach entails one starts with the simulation model that relates to the 
target phenomena in the most straight-forward way possible, taking into account the 
widest possible range of evidence, including anecdotal accounts and expert opinion.  
Simplification is only applied if and when the model and evidence justify this.  This 
contrasts sharply with the KISS approach where one starts with the simplest possible 
model and only moves to a more complex one if forced to.  An example multi-agent 
simulation of domestic water demand and social influence is described. 
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Introduction 
The popular admonition to “Keep It Simple Stupid” or KISS, makes good sense if 
you are designing or constructing something – that is, if one has a particular 
specification, function or purpose in mind and one is trying to construct something 
appropriate.  In this context the advice makes sense in two ways: firstly, that the 
more complex something is the less easy it is to control (and hence to make it do 
what one wants); and, secondly, in circumstances where a particular design does not 
work that one should resist elaborating it in an attempt to make it work but rather one 
should engage in a more fundamental re-evaluation (since such elaboration seldom 
really works) [0].   
However the KISS sentiment is often also applied to the business of modelling some 
phenomena, e.g. with a simulation or a set of equations.  So that even when faced 
with obviously complex phenomena modellers strive to keep their models simple, to 
an extent that is beyond any evident justification.  The reasons for this are varied, if 
often left implicit.  There are obvious practical reasons for keeping a model simple – 
this makes it easier to: implement; manipulate; analyse; check; communicate, etc..  
However, it is sometimes claimed (and often implied) that the advantages of 
simplicity go beyond these practical values – that a simpler model is more likely to 
be true; or gets closer to the essence of the matter.  In other words, that a simpler 
model is, in general, fundamentally better – it is this we are arguing against.   
We suggest a new slogan: “Keep It Descriptive Stupid” or KIDS – which is supposed 
to suggest the approach to modelling where one starts with a descriptive model 
(which may be quite complex) and then only simplifies it where this turns out to be 
justified.  This is in contrast to the KISS paradigm where one only tries a more 
complex model if simpler ones turn out to be inadequate.  Multi-agent based 
simulation (MABS) not only facilitates the KIDS approach but epitomises it.  Thus 
the importance of the move towards MABS can be seen as part of a broader 
movement away from unjustified abstraction in modelling – abstraction that is, since 
the advent of accessible computational power, frequently unnecessary. 
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This can be seen as the encapsulation of a trend in some agent-based social 
simulation work where relatively rich models are being developed, often in close 
collaboration with relevant stakeholders.  We do not have space here or the time for a 
survey of such models, but point to some recent work, including many in: the journal 
JASSS (http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk); the recent ESSA (http://essa.eu.org) conference;  and a 
forthcoming special issue of Simulation on applications of agent-base social 
simulation.  Examples of work progressing in this direction include [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]. 
We necessarily can not deal with all the issues this paper raises – this would take a 
book rather than a workshop paper.  Thus this paper has to be more in the way of a 
summary which passes over many of the arguments.  We are forced to refer to our 
previous work for many of these issues – these will provide a more adequate 
entrance to the relevant literatures.  We apologise for this.  Thus for more on the 
meaning and definition of complexity see [0]; for the issue of how and why one 
might judge one model to be better that another see [0, 0]; for more on the relation of 
the scientific process to simplicity see [0]; for an extended paper on why simplicity is 
not truth-indicative see [0]; for more on the relation of formal systems to the 
scientific process see [0]; for more on the intended theory/implemented simulation 
distinction and its ramification see [0, 0]; and for more on constructive ways forward 
see [0]. 
Why KIDS rather than KISS? 
We are limited beings, which could explain why simplicity has such advantages and 
attractions for us.  It also seems we have a tendency to project our own 
characteristics upon the natural world, thus we would like to think that everything 
has an “inner” simplicity even if they appear to be very complicated.  Sometimes 
this is expressed as an assumption that simplicity is a (fallible) guide to truth, 
sometimes by conflating simplicity with generality (hiding the assumption that 
simpler models will apply to a greater variety of real cases, an assumption that is 
often unjustified). 
When a modelling decision is justified using a phrase like “for the sake of 
simplicity” it is implicit that this is (in some sense) a good justification.  People do 
not tend to justify their modelling decisions in papers using phrases such as: “it 
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would have taken too long”; “we could not think how to do this”; or “it would make 
it very hard to check”, despite the fact that, in our view, these are perfectly 
acceptable (indeed inevitable) reasons for beings with limited resources (like us).  
Rather, often it seems that people invoke simplicity because of its positive 
connotations, even if it was the more practical reasons that motivated them (of 
course, they also do so because that is what they were taught, but presumably the 
teachers had some reason for supposing this etc.).  Thus the philosophical tradition 
that somehow simplicity is truth indicative gives credence to modelling decisions 
that are not otherwise explicitly justified.  Elsewhere I (BE) argue that simplicity is 
not truth-indicative [0]. 
Rather we suggest that one would expect that, for many purposes and for many 
phenomena, that the models will need to be complex if they are to be adequate for 
the purposes for which the model is built.  Given that much that we study is complex, 
it would be very surprising if it always turned out to be the case that the models 
could be simple.  Surely the burden of proof is on those who insist that it is not 
sensible to try and match the complexity of the model with the complexity of the 
phenomena being modelled.  The facts that complex outcomes can emerge from 
apparently simple systems (as in mathematics or ALife) does not mean that the 
complex phenomena we now observe is reducible to simple models. Even if (a huge 
presumption) a certain phenomena was generated using simple mechanisms, this 
does not mean the results we observe now are simple or could be usefully 
represented with a simple model.  For more on the difference between kinds of 
complexity see [0]. 
To make this clear consider an analogy with a 19
th
 Centaury naturalist making 
sketches of animals.  The naturalist is doing this in order to help correctly identify 
and classify new species.  It would have been laughable to suggest that such sketches 
should be limited to line cartoons “for the sake of simplicity”, “so that they have the 
greatest possible generality”, because the different species would not have been 
identified yet.  It may have been that small details would have turned out to be 
important later for distinguishing closely-related species.  Only when the naturalist 
had examined (and sketched) enough individuals would it have become clear which 
details were relevant and which not.  The details that turned out to be essential may 
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have allowed the drawings to be significantly simplified a posterior, but in many 
cases only marginally simplified (as with moths).  The point is that it is simply not 
appropriate to make simplifications before one knows what is relevant and what is 
not.  Simply hoping that one may have chanced upon an appropriate simplification 
does not make that simplification justified.   
This is even more evident when one is considering the domain of interacting systems 
of flexible and autonomous actors or agents.  The relevant behaviour of many such 
systems will not be simple, in particular they will not be reducible to aggregate 
models (for example statistical models) without significantly diverging from their 
target systems (that is, the agents are „embedded‟ in their society in the sense of [0]).  
This includes multi-agent systems that are designed for a specific purpose [0]. 
Adopting a multi-agent model represents a move towards descriptive accuracy since: 
actors or agents in the target domain are represented by agents in the model and 
communications by messages between the agents. That is MABS allows and 
facilitates a more direct correspondence between what is observed and what is 
modelled.  One benefit of this move to descriptive MABS is that a whole swath of 
evidence becomes available for validating our models – straight-forward descriptive 
evidence gained from observation of the domain can be applied to the model by 
virtue of the more straight-forward correspondence. What is new is that this evidence 
may be anecdotal or “common-sense”.  Previously such evidence may have been 
rejected on the ground that it is not “scientific” or “rigorous”, but this was because it 
was not formalisable in terms of the current modelling technology (analytic 
mathematics) and hence had no deducible outcomes that could be checked.  Now 
such qualitative information can be formally modelled in simulations where the 
deduction of outcomes is performed computationally rather than analytically.  
Further, in a descriptive MABS, this is relatively easy and natural and combines 
naturally with participative approaches to model construction and validation, as in 
[0]. 
Given that such evidence can be made rigorous and thus brought within the domain 
of the scientific, it should not be ignored.  Thus if you have a target domain in which 
there is such evidence (such as “it seems that the actors learn to avoid areas where 
they were mugged”) then models should only ignore such evidence if either: (1) there 
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is good reason to think this is irrelevant or (2) there is evidence that this is wrong 
(e.g. over-simplified to the extent that it is significantly erroneous).  In particular if 
one has access to a direct or expert “common-sense” account of a particular social or 
other agent-based system, then one needs to justify a model that ignores this solely 
on a priori grounds.  In other words, constructing a model that is simpler only “for 
the sake of simplicity” may be a case of wilfully ignoring evidence.   
Thus a move towards descriptive models allows for more of the available evidence to 
be applied.  Of course, all available evidence should be used, including evidence that 
is traditionally used: time series data, point measurements, statistics etc. and 
evidence resulting from new methods of data collection (as suggested in [0]). This 
can be used as a sort of check of the anecdotal evidence, because one can check that 
a model constructed on the basis of anecdotal evidence is consistent with them (see 
[0] or references above for many others who suggest this).  As with all data, one 
takes into account its reliability.  Anecdotal evidence can be unreliable – however 
this does not mean we should not use it, merely that we need to cross-check it (as 
with any other useful but fallible evidence), but this is exactly what MABS 
facilitates.   
This is an uncomfortable lesson for us: that the common-sense description may be a 
far better starting place than an artificially simple construction based on the guesses 
of academics.  However, if one is modelling social or multi-agent systems, where the 
phenomena is undoubtedly complex (making a priori guessing difficult) it is not 
sensible to ignore any evidence that may help us.  The more complex the phenomena 
the more evidence as to its workings are needed. 
One common response to the arguments above is to claim that one is doing a sort of 
applicable mathematics rather than science. That is, one is not claiming that a 
particular model (or simulation) represents in any sense any observed phenomena but 
that one is merely establishing the model‟s properties, so that in the future someone 
may be able to successfully apply it to solving real problems.  I call this the 
“formalist stance” – it  is often adopted in fields which are currently lacking 
significant empirical or practical success (e.g. AI or Economics).  The argument goes 
thus: much mathematics that was driven by goals other than representing reality (but 
sometimes including simplicity) turned out to be very useful later on,  might not the 
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same thing happen with developing abstract simulations.  The answer is that this is 
possible, but then the simulation (or model) should be judged by the same sort of 
criteria as is used to judge new mathematics, namely: precision, soundness, 
importance and generality.  The assumptions/mechanisms upon which the results 
depend should have been made completely explicit and precise. The model should be 
very thoroughly tested to almost eliminate any possibility of error in the results (this 
will almost certainly involve a wide search of the parameter space and independent 
replication in the case of complex simulations).  The results should be sufficiently 
important in that they effectively present (to us humans) new information about the 
system that is not available from a casual inspection of the simulation set-up and 
inputs.  Finally, it should be established that the results are applicable to a wide range 
of kinds of system.  All too often simulations that are claim protection under the 
formalist stance do not justify themselves against these criteria but rather via the 
credibility of their results in terms of observed phenomena. Thus they fail to satisfy 
any set of relevant academic criteria. These issues are discussed further in [0]. 
To summarise, the KISS approach says that one needs a good reason not to use the 
simplest model, and then allows for progressively more complex models if simpler 
ones turn out to be inadequate.  In contrast the KIDS approach starts with a model 
that is as straight-forwardly descriptive as evidence and resources allow (even if this 
means that one starts with relatively complex model) and then allows for progressive  
development later (including simplification and abstraction) as evidence and 
understanding of the model support this (it may turn out that some features that turn 
out to be important later have been left out, leading to an even more complex model).  
This is shown in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. An Illustration of KISS and KIDS  
 
Distinguishing Intended Theories and Implemented Models 
In this discussion it is important to distinguish between the intended theory and the 
implemented simulation (or model) that is meant to realise that theory in 
computational (or analytic) form.  There are many ways in which this distinction is 
significant.  In general, there will be many ways of constructing a simulation to 
embody any particular theory, because only certain aspects of the simulation are 
considered significant in terms of the theory, the rest being considered as the 
mechanisms to produce these.  There will be various artefacts introduced as a side-
effect of a particular implementation, so that the implemented model differs from the 
intended theory. This might be in ways that are considered unimportant, for example 
in miniscule deviations due to the pseudo-random number generator, or it may turn 
out to be significant (when a seemingly-innocent implementation detail significantly 
changes the results, e.g. as documents in [0]).  All too often the implemented 
simulation and the intended theory are conflated or the intended theory is not 
described explicitly. This distinction is discussed further in [0]. 
In this paper we are arguing that the intended theory should (as a starting point) be as 
descriptive as possible and that a (single) simulation should be as direct a 
representation of this theory as is feasible.  Of course, if there are two completely 
adequate ways of implementing the same theory as simulations then (for practical 
reasons) it is sensible to choose the simpler one.  However feasibility considerations 
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concerning the implemented simulation should not lead one to simplify the intended 
theory – this would be a case of “the tail wagging the dog”.  Rather if it is infeasible 
(for whatever reason) to implement a simulation of the intended theory, then this 
should be explicitly acknowledged.   
When it is infeasible to implement a simulation that is adequate (for a specific 
purpose) to the intended theory (a common case in social simulation) one has a 
number of ways in which one can proceed.  Often the wisest course is to abandon 
formal (including computational) modelling as (at least currently) beyond our 
capabilities.  This may be followed by a decision to change the modelling goal to 
something less ambitious – for example to restrict the theory to cover a small aspect 
or special case.  This might result in a new intended theory that is feasible to 
implement.  The temptation here is to not admit one has taken this step – to pretend 
(to oneself) that the resulting feasible simulation is somehow still a model of the 
original intended theory.   
Building upwards from descriptively adequate models 
In this section we briefly outline a suggestion as to a constructive way forward in the 
face of extremely complex phenomena (such as with social systems and „non-toy‟ 
MAS).  More about this can be found in [0].   
Before we even get to descriptive simulations one has a series of “Data Models” [0] 
– that is, descriptions or data obtained by either measurement or elicitation.  These 
provide the foundations upon which descriptive simulations will be built.   
When one has a number of descriptive simulations concerning a related class of 
phenomena (satisfying similar purposes), one may be in a position to see what is 
relevant to a more abstract simulation, by examining the processes that result in 
these.  It may well be that the abstract simulation only applies to the behaviour of 
descriptive simulations under certain conditions or (to use terminology from physics) 
within certain phases.   
It may then be possible to formulate analytic models about the behaviour of aspects 
of the abstract simulation.  For example, it may be observed that a certain process 
dominates the results in certain conditions and this can be approximated by some 
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analytic or statistical models.  The huge advantage of approaching abstract and 
analytic models in this way is that it provides a traceable chain of reference to 
observations of the phenomena.  Thus if we ask why a certain term has a particular 
exponent in an analytic model, we can point to the behaviour in the abstract 
simulation this approximates.  This can guide us when adapting or improving the 
analytics, especially when we are fault finding.  Similarly, the mechanisms in the 
abstract model can be traced to the descriptive models it represents etc. 
If one is in the fortunate position where a number of these analytic models or abstract 
simulations concur then this might be a sought-after general theory covering a range 
of phenomena.  Such a theory can then be tested against the class of phenomena it 
concerns.   
Later on, once the general theory has been thoroughly validated in multiple ways, it 
may be possible to simplify and systematise it.  This process has occurred frequently 
in Physics.  Whereas only a few people could understand Newtonian mechanics as it 
was first presented, nowadays it has been systematised into the accounts found in 
standard school text books.  Such systemisation and simplification greatly facilities 
its applications to problems and new phenomena. 
It is highly unlikely that „short-cuts‟ to the simple or general theories will be 
discovered without a substantial amount of lower level data-collection and modelling 
has occurred first.  This seems to be because the human mind requires conceptual 
frameworks to work within, which then trap us into formulating models similar to 
those that have gone before.  It often seems to require a substantial (if sometimes 
indirect) „jolt‟ from the phenomena itself to guide us towards really useful theory. 
To summarise this, complex phenomena will not only require more complex 
simulations, but also the development and maintenance of complex clusters of 
models, as suggested in [0].  There are other ways in which such clusters may be 
created, such a using a number of models in parallel to cover different aspects of the 
same intended theory, this is discussed to a limited extent in [0]. 
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Fig. 2. An illustration of the bottom-up way of model development  
 
Exploring Variations of a Model of Domestic Water Demand 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the KISS approach.  Thus we have here 
started with a model that encapsulates the aspects of the target domain for which we 
have (formal or informal) information.  We then explore the behaviour of the model 
when different aspects stay the same – that is to see if one can find any aspects which 
do not have a relevant and significant impact on the chosen outcomes. This would 
then suggest a hypothesis that a simpler model is possible, which excludes this 
aspect.  If all aspects seem to be essential to maintaining the properties of the 
outcomes that are deemed to be representative of what is reported, then this suggests 
that a simpler model would not be descriptively adequate.  If this is the case it is 
difficult to see that such a model would have been reached by starting from a simpler 
model and elaborating it.  Of course what we have is a complex model whose 
behaviour is not fully understood – it acts as an intermediary between observation 
and theory building. 
The model in this example is a descriptive social simulation.  It seeks to see how the 
patterns of domestic water demand in localities may be explained by mutual 
influence. To be exact, it models how a set of stakeholders perceived that households 
might interact because it was developed as the result of some input from a panel of 
representatives from UK water companies and other domain experts.  This model 
aimed to: capture their qualitative informal suggestions (e.g. demand rebounds fairly 
fast after a drought); be consistent with known data about households (e.g. 
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ownership/frequency/use data); and have aggregate demand patterns similar to those 
observed (e.g. with clustered volatility).  It was developed as part of the FIRMA1 and 
CC:DEW2 projects – for a more detailed description see [0].  The initial model was 
written by Scott Moss and then developed by Olivier Bathelemy and Bruce 
Edmonds.   
The core of this model is a set of agents, each representing a household, which are 
situated on a grid.  Each of these households is allocated a set of water-using devices 
in a similar distribution to those in the mid-Thames region of the UK.  At the 
beginning of each month each household sets the frequency the appliance is used 
(and in some cases the volume at each use, depending on the appliance).  Households 
are influenced as to their usage of these appliances by several sources:  their 
neighbours and particularly the neighbour most similar to themselves (for publicly 
observable appliances); the policy agent; what they themselves did in the past; and 
occasionally the new kinds appliances that are available (in this case power showers, 
or water-saving washing machines).  The individual household‟s demands are 
summed to give the aggregate demand.  Each month the ground water saturation is 
calculated based on weather data (which is past data or past simulated data), if this is 
less than a critical amount for more than a month, this triggers the policy agent to 
suggest a lower usage of water.  If a period of drought continues it progressively 
suggests using less and less water.  The households are biased to attend to the 
influence of neighbours or the policy agent to different extents – the proportion of 
these biases are set by the simulator.  This structure is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 3. The structure of the water demand model 
                                                 
1 http://firma.cfpm.org 
2 http://www.sei.se/oxford/ccdew 
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The neighbours in this model are those either those in the shape of a cross or a square 
neighbourhood (Fig. 3). The extent of this neighbourhood is parameterised by the 
area (in the cases in Fig. 3 this is 8).   
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Fig. 4. The neighbourhood pattern for the households, left cross, right square (each area 8) 
Every neighbour has a unique most neighbour who is most influential to it, the 
topology of this social network consists of a few pairs of mutually most influential 
neighbours and a tree of influence spreading out from these. The extent of the 
influence that is transmitted over any particular path of this network will depend 
upon the extent each node in the path is biased towards being influenced by 
neighbours.  
Households are also (to a lesser extent) also influenced by all its neighbours in its 
neighbourhood. The edges of this may or may not be wrapped around into a torus.  
The focus model used an unwrapped  cross-shaped neighbourhood so the households 
at the edges and corners have fewer neighbours that those in the middle.  The reason 
for this that the resulting patterns seem to us a reasonable mix of locality and 
complexity (data on the actual patterns was not available). 
In each run the households are distributed and initialised randomly, whilst the overall 
distribution of the ownership and usages of appliances by the households and the 
biases of the households is approximately the same.  In the runs described herein the 
same weather data is used, so the timing of droughts (and hence advice from the 
policy agent) and of new innovations are the same in each run.   
The graphs below (such as Fig. 4 immediately below) show the aggregate demand 
resulting from many runs of the same set-up (rescaled so that 1973=100 for ease of 
comparison).  Each line shows a different run from using that set-up, so you can see 
the variations in aggregate behaviour possible from the same model.  Significant 
events include the droughts of 1976 and 1990, which often show up in a 
(temporarily) reduced water demand, due to agents taking the advice from the policy 
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agent to use less water.  Power showers become available in early 1988 and water-
saving washing machines in late 1992 which can cause a sudden increase or decrease 
respectively. 
Cross unwrapped (24, 2.5)
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Fig. 5. Relative aggregate demand levels (cross-shaped unwrapped neighbourhoods of size 24) 
Fig. 4 shows the model set-up chosen as the starting point for the model variations.  
It shows 15 different runs of that model.  The droughts of 1976 and 1990 are clear as 
dips in demand in most (but not all) of the runs and the introduction of power 
showers in 1988 precipitate a sharp upturn in demand.  It is noticeable that each such 
„shock‟ can cause a lasting period of volatility in a demand line, possibly in the 
opposite direction as the original shock (as in the top line in Fig. 4).  This seems to 
be because the influence is not significantly dampened but „rings‟ around the model 
and changes become locked-in due to mutually self-reinforcing influence between 
households.  Fig. 5 shows the difference when the network of influence is limited to 
only adjoining neighbours which cuts out most of the social influence.  The pattern is 
usually regular and predictable for most households –unlike observed patterns of 
water demand. 
It is important that each run can turn out to be different, even though the parameters 
and set-up is the same.  This is due to the fact that, in the Thames Valley in the UK, 
very similar neighbourhoods (in terms of socio-economic profile and size) can 
display very different patterns of aggregate water demand.  Thus this model is not 
only intended to capture a typical water demand response but the range of water 
demand responses.  For this reason one run (or even statistics about many runs) is 
insufficient to characterise the output from a particular model set-up.  Thus in the 
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examples below we will show a set of runs, to give some idea about the range of 
behaviours that each set-up can exhibit. 
Cross unwrapped (16, 2.5)
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Fig. 6. As Fig. 4 but with neighbourhoods of size 4 
Next we change the topology of the social influence network so that the social 
relations are wrapped-around as if they lived on a torus – this is shown in Fig. 6.  
This has the effect of increasing the short-term volatility of many of the runs but 
decreasing the longer-term variation in a run.  It seems that the whole population can 
„flip‟ from one behaviour to another – they are too connected.  This contrasts with 
the runs shown in Fig. 4 where different behavioural „regimes‟ may be found on 
different edges of the population. The shape of the neighbourhood also seems to 
make a difference.   
Cross unwrapped (16, 2.5)
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Fig. 7. As Fig. 4 but with wrapped neighbourhoods (rather than unwrapped) 
Fig. 7 shows what happens when the shape of the neighbourhood is changed to a 
block shape (see Fig. 3).  This appears to lessen the impact of droughts. 
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Cross unwrapped (16, 2.5)
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Fig. 8.  As Fig. 4 but with block-shaped neighbourhoods (rather than cross-shaped) 
Lastly we experimented with the memory coefficient.  This halved the rate at which 
past behaviours are forgotten, this is shown in Fig. 8.   
Cross unwrapped (16, 2.5)
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Fig. 9. As Fig. 4 but with a memory coefficient of 5 (rather than 2.5) 
Unsurprisingly many of the lines are a lot flatter.  In particular many more of the 
demand patterns reverted after droughts to the levels they were before them.  The 
introduction of innovations still has an affect on the general levels. 
Elsewhere [0] it was shown that the: climatologically data: the timing of innovation 
introduction; and the proportion of different biases as to influence sources can all 
make a marked qualitative difference to the aggregate demand patterns that result.  
However [0] also showed that the shape of the initial distribution of the use of 
appliances in households turned out not to be important and hence could be 
simplified. Thus this element is a candidate for simplification. 
 19 
To summarise these results and those from [0]. it appears that the following elements 
of the model are important to the kinds of results that one gets out of the model:  the 
number and size of droughts, the distribution of biases of the households, the timing 
of innovations, the rate of forgetting, the neighbourhood shape, the topology of the 
influence grid, and the size of the neighbourhoods.  This makes is rather unlikely that 
a simpler model, that eliminated these would have been descriptively adequate.  
However it does not rule out the possibility that there are other aspects that might 
turn out to be unnecessary to produce the desired outputs. 
Discussion – Simplification and Relevance 
MABS models allow for a finer-grained comparison than traditional „black-box‟ 
models.  If the outputs from two „black-box‟ models are the same given identical 
inputs, then they are functionally equivalent.  In contrast MABS models allow for 
comparison at finer-grains both in time and in detail.  Thus, for example, if two 
models differ significantly in the behaviour of individual agents as they interact then 
they are different, as with different interactive processes that generate the same 
aggregate outcomes. 
This means that it is extremely unlikely that any simplification of a MABS model 
will result in a completely equivalent model.  Even when the results appear to be 
indistinguishable within a particular range of parameters and set-ups, it is likely that, 
with enough ingenuity, it will be possible to find some settings and initialisations that 
will force any two different models to diverge in terms of behaviour, and if this is 
then run for long enough this divergence will become statistically significant.  Even 
if the same algorithm is implemented on two different systems, there will be details 
such as the nature of the floating-point representation and random number generators 
that would eventually cause detectable differences [0, 0]. 
Thus the aim of simplifying models should not be that they retain all the behaviours 
of the more complex model, but rather that they retain all relevant behaviours.  So 
before one attempts simplification, one has to decide exactly what it is about the 
behaviour that is considered significant.  Then one can investigate how one can 
simplify models whilst preserving this behaviour.  One corollary of this is that it may 
well be that different simplifications will be appropriate when the same model is used 
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for different purposes or in different contexts.  This context-dependency of 
simplification is opposite to that in the KISS approach, for there one makes a model 
more complex in order to be less general. 
Conclusion 
The difficult part in science is not finding attractive abstract models, but of relating 
abstract models to the world (i.e. the target domain).  The KISS approach ensures that 
one has an attractive and understandable model, but does not (of itself) give any 
reason to suppose that it will lead to models that relate strongly enough to the target 
domain so as to usefully inform us about that domain.  The KIDS approach starts 
with a model which relates as strongly to the target domain as possible, but does not 
ensure that the models are “elegant”.  Before the advent of cheap computational 
power, it was only possible to get any results out of analytic (and hence relatively 
simple models), this made the KIDS approach infeasible. 
The trade-off between the practicality of our models and their descriptive adequacy 
is a complex and context-dependent  one – as with all modelling decisions, there is 
no final and general answer [0].  Neither the KISS nor the KIDS approach will always 
be the best one, and complex mixtures of the two will be frequently appropriate.  
However the balance is shifting away from KISS and towards KIDS in areas 
dominated by complex phenomena.  In such areas there is no reason to suppose that 
elegant models will be particularly useful and the advent of MABS facilitates the 
creation, management and communication of complex, descriptive models.   
In short, when modelling multi-agent and multi-actor systems, (where there are many 
good reasons to suspect that things will be very complex), one would need strong 
reasons for adopting a KISS methodology – much better reasons than empty 
invocations of “simplicity”.  In science, at least, truth comes before beauty.  
References  
Axtell, R., & al. (1996), Aligning Simulation Models: A Case Study and Results, 
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 1:123-141. 
Barreteau, O. & al. (2001). Role-playing games for opening the black box of multi-
agent systems: method and lessons of its application to Senegal River Valley 
 21 
irrigated systems. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 4(2), 
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/4/2/5.html> 
Barthelemy, O. (2003) The impact of the model structure in social simulations, 1
st
 
International Conference of the European Social Simulation Association, Gronigen, 
the Netherlands, September 2003. <http://cfpm.org/cpmrep121.html> 
Chattoe, E. (2002). Building Empirically Plausible Multi-Agent Systems: A Case 
Study of Innovation Diffusion. In K. Dautenhahn, & al. (eds.). Socially Intelligent 
Agents - creating relationships with computers and robots. Dordrecht, Kluwer. 
Downing, T.E, & al. (2003). Climate Change and the Demand for Water, Research 
Report, Stockholm Environment Institute Oxford Office. 
<http://www.sei.se/oxford/ccdew> 
Edmonds, B. (1999). Syntactic Measures of Complexity. Doctoral Thesis, University 
of Manchester, Manchester, UK. <http://bruce.edmonds.name/thesis> 
Edmonds, B. (2000). Complexity and Scientific Modelling. Foundations of Science, 
5:379-390. 
Edmonds, B. (2000) The Purpose and Place of Formal Systems in the Development 
of Science, CPM Report 00-75. <http://cfpm.org/cpmrep75.html> 
Edmonds, B. (2001) The Use of Models - making MABS actually work. In. Moss, S. 
& Davidsson, P. (eds.), Multi Agent Based Simulation, Lecture Notes in Artificial 
Intelligence, 1979:15-32.  
Edmonds, B. (2002) Simplicity is Not Truth-Indicative. CPM Report 02-99. 
<http://cfpm.org/cpmrep99.html> 
Edmonds, B. (in press) Simulation and Complexity - how they can relate. In 
Feldmann, V. and Mühlfeld, K. (eds.) Virtual Worlds of Precision. Lit Verlag.  
<http://cfpm.org/cpmrep118.html> 
Edmonds, B. & Bryson, J. (2004) The Insufficiency of Formal Design Methods - the 
necessity of an experimental approach for the understanding and control of complex 
MAS. In Jennings, N. R. et al. (eds.) Proceedings of the 3
rd
 International Joint 
 22 
Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS'04), July 19-23, 
New York, ACM Press,  938-945. 
Edmonds, B. & Hales, D. (2003) Computational Simulation as Theoretical 
Experiment, CPM report 03-106. (submitted to the Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology). <http://cfpm.org/cpmrep106.html> 
Edmonds, B. and Hales, D. (2003) Replication, Replication and Replication - some 
hard lessons from model alignment.  Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation  6(4) <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/4/11.html> 
Etienne, M., Le Page, C. & Cohen, M. (2003) A Step-by-step Approach to Building 
Land Management Scenarios Based on Multiple Viewpoints on Multi-agent System 
Simulations. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 6(2) 
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/2/2.html> 
Giere, R. N. (1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic-Action and Social-Structure – The Problem of 
Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510. 
Moss, S. (1998). Critical Incident Management: An Empirically Derived 
Computational Model. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 1(4), 
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk /1/4/1.html> 
Moss, S. (2002). Policy Analysis from First Principles. Proceedings of the US 
National Academy of Sciences 99:7267-7274.   
Moss, S. & Edmonds, B. (accepted) Sociology and Simulation: Statistical and 
Qualitative Cross-Validation. American Journal of Sociology.  Earlier version is 
CPM report 03-105. <http://cfpm.org/cpmrep105.html> 
Pohill, J. G., Izquierdo, L. R. & Gotts, N. M. (2003) The Ghost in the Model (and 
other effects of floating point arithmetic). 1
st
 International Conference of the 
European Social Simulation Association, Gronigen, the Netherlands, September 
 23 
2003.  
<http://www.uni-koblenz.de/~kgt/ESSA/ESSA1/Polhill-Izquierdo-Gotts.pdf> 
Rouchier, J. (2004) Interaction Routines and Selfish Behaviours in an Artificial 
Market – Transferring field observations of a wholesale fruits and vegetables market 
into a multi-agent model. CPM Report No.: CPM-04-130. 
<http://cfpm.org/cpmrep130.html> 
Suppes, P. (1962). Models of Data. Logic In E. Nagel, P. Suppes & A. Tarski (eds.) 
Methodology and the Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International 
Congress. Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press: 252-261.  
Taylor, R. (2003) Agent-Based Modelling Incorporating Qualitative and Quantitative 
Methods: A Case Study Investigating the Impact of E-commerce upon the Value 
Chain. 1
st
 International Conference of the European Social Simulation Association, 
Gronigen, the Netherlands, September 2003. <http://cfpm.org/cpmrep123.html> 
 
